

3

Sept 1 KAC

Sept. 26 1983 Petrov & Volintsev court

Being about to be stricken

Do it hard to find people who can be trained
to really say an order (follow directions) that
will (they know) last life — in the SU
or elsewhere

Europe

the US

(Is it completely well
fulfilled the expectation?

No

on earth?

12-13-15
1991 3

Why did Cuba August 19-21 have to
face?

What if?

(Port gone; wall down)

| Did SU and Warsaw Pact
if it had been, Henry (NATO?)
did not?

from 1949 on (or earlier,
if we gave some
A-bombs: "closed" ?
earlier)

If both started with A-bomb
Race?

Could it have been avoided?
point before?

No (?) SU and to give Henry?

Desmond Henry?
(? Japan?)

12-15-15

(12)
W

area, united: ~ South Africa,
or alone

CW combine SU fear of Germany or alone

+ Russia: claim not to be territorial, occupied;
⑨ loose Post, barrier; ⑩ SU-CP kept

and Europe/NATO fear of Germany
no-area, united
distinct

claim not to be dominant,
or dropped into very

so no desire (if wants?) not to

"allow" Germany area, or control

(they like the don't have this
or CP?

JFK? (Russia, OK —

Others — vs. McN (why?)

vs. (MCF - others, —

Russia?

→ US DOM, followed by SU DM (after C-II,
loss of K
(after loss of
VFR -)

US CW/NATO strategy: "Russia out, US in, Germany down."

Margins US FUD about vs. no-area Soviets

see JSCP: What if uprising (East Berlin, Hungary, Poland
(other)
cyclic

is part of Post cold front?

Do we feel to retreat?

If SU forces retreat from
into West? (Russia in Poland ~ 1980.

But not 1981?

PDS

8AM

12-11-15

1

If Hitler had gotten 10 bombs
US none.

(if he had wanted to attack SU
until he has the —
as early, Red Alert)

(Robbins, Holmes, Downing... opposed
Banana...)

(Hitler expected uprising vs. Stalins...)

(Cuba)

DRV / SVN

VR / Russia

US / SH (1991+)

an Airway, proper:

If SU had bomb (not US)
should US have informed?

If ~~SU~~ had super (not Teller-Ulam)
should US have gotten it?

If super had proved friendly
and not intended
with too many until SAC have opposed it?

Are differences between Teller-Ulam
and "classified super" all public now?
Basic designs?

12-9-15

If FDR had ^{foretold Pearl} favored P-Harby -
what would be have done?

LIHOP?

If GNB " " "

?

LIHOP?

Ask: Did the device exist?

Coder with some example built to LIHOP?

What if other just averted it?

P.H. (Send carrier to interrupt
more battleships -.

What then? No sup.-attack south?
Philippines?

No US-sup.-war?

Hawaii? Hitler decisions?

(all this depends on FOR not foreseen
P.H.?)

What would LBJ have done if he did foresee:

Any 2 attacks? (cavil 34A?
or 34B?)

Qd. 4 "attacks"

(advise LBJ? We got a "surprise"
(after warning, 2nd destroy,
carries...))

(12-15-15) (7)

It could have been worse.

1) We could have boycotted (as in Kraszna: who we had monopoly; but we did in Berlin '48 and even Korea '50-53)

(3) ~~②~~ gone on bid about fugacity when SU and, or R (e.g. 1995!)

1983

1979

(WF was still
married)

or even DGP '53

(~~said~~ we had
N-bombs; or
China...)

(4) ~~③~~
OR: Some SU or US breach right
now in right time as Hitler!

instead of threatening (each case)

(not "Unterhölzer"), taken
impossibly

(2)
OR: Carnival out all
threats

In 1983, "nations went wary" (except Pinochet & computers)

If Peronist deal revised NATO about...

(It's true) that if Stalin had believed what Andreopoulous learned about US — that option was (considered) like Hitler — SU would have done much better in 1941 (even without preexisting)

[HFOR...Plane Harbor? If no P.H. — is better way?]

x

What different expectations (differences?)
of war?

what have avoided WWI?

✓

WWII?

12-7-115

What if ~~she~~ ~~butcher~~ went
by Andropov died — or Major? Revolution? LBJ?

Conde Nast saw him as

enough as Andropov² thought he was?
or " " " was?!

WERE SOUS / ANDROPOV CRAZY? "PARASOIDIO"?

RISAGEN IN 1936(G²)
81-~~KINOREVY?~~

LBJ in MAY 1965?

What do we really
care for
and care about
about Banks?

Different from
Byers/Wall/Holt?

(≠ Wallace)

Notes from talk with Dan, December 6, 2015

- 1983 war scare
- my thoughts; PD 59, winnable nuclear war (going back to Dan's 61 revision of SIOP)
- 83 crisis; comparative study of crises
- relevant aspects; construction of instability, incentives for preemption
- other aspects (some contradictory); decapitation
- crisis, nuclear freeze movement, Gorbachev, and Dan in Moscow (1990)
- his call for new initiatives
- why this?; because of its importance for now
- relevant sources; *Pallid Giant*

the following are quotes:

- from Fred Kaplan's (1983: 383-384) *The Wizards of Armageddon*:

...PD-59, signed by Jimmy Carter on July 25, 1980. It ordered options that were still more limited, a withheld reserve force that was slightly larger, a greater emphasis on using nuclear weapons to destroy conventional military targets, including targets that might be moving on the battlefield; and it planned more explicitly for the possibility of fighting a nuclear war over an extended period of time...Fundamentally, there was nothing new about PD-59. It was merely an elaboration of NSDM-242, which grew out of the Foster Panel, which was explicitly based on McNamara's SIOP-62, guidance of 1961-1962, which was modelled on a decade of analysis at RAND. The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review, which led to PD-59, was handled in part through the Pentagon's office of net assessment, still run by Andy Marshall. It was ultimately directed by a Pentagon analyst named Leon Sloss...."

- (356)

...Air Force thinking since the end of World War II...more toward thinking about how to use these weapons, how to *fight* with them, and how to use them *rationally*.

A small nucleus of Air Staff officers who shared this line of thinking banded together on a project called NU-OPTS, for Nuclear Options or Nuclear Operations.

[James Schlesinger]

(365) Ivan Selin...Alain Enthoven's deputy for strategic systems in the last years of the Lyndon Johnson Administration...

[completes NSSM No. 3 in 1969, which imagines] "steps in an escalating crisis in which both sides want to avoid attacking cities," ; (366) [damage limitation, etc]; "If the language sounded familiar...it was no coincidence. Selin and his aides had thoroughly studies McNamara's SIOP-63 guidance and were seeking to apply its basic principles to contemporary conditions...."

(369) "Foster Panel...essentially a mixture of counterforce/no cities and NU-OPTS....

NSDM-242 "fair reflection of the work by the Foster Panel." (369-370)

- (387) 1982 Top Secret Defense Guidance: US to have nuclear forces that could "prevail...force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States"—in short, to fight and win a protracted nuclear war. Lying at the heart of this guidance was the old "coercive strategy"; hurt the enemy and make him quit by threatening to hurt him more with a durable reserve force held squarely at bay.
 - This was no mere coincidence. The chief authors of this document were Andrew Marshall...Fred Ikle...and Richard Perle," mentee of Wohlsteter.
 - To look up; range of cruise? Capable of hitting Moscow?
 - Find out where Sloss says he went back to Dan's guidance (I thought this was in *Wizards of Armageddon*); but maybe Des Ball instead.
 - Henry Sokolski (Getting Mad?)
 - (perhaps it's a little more convoluted, where the various studies trace back to this, as indicated by Kaplan).

